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CASE NOTES
Federal Jurisdiction—"Federal Common Law" vs. State Law.—United
States v. Yazell.' —Respondent and her husband signed a promissory note
to repay money borrowed as a disaster loan from the Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA). 2 A local Texas law firm, employed by the SBA to assist
respondent and her husband in complying with the terms of the loan, and the
Acting Regional Counsel of the SBA certified that " 'all action has been taken
deemed desirable ... to assure the validity and legal enforceability of the
Note.'"s After default by the husband, the federal government foreclosed
on a chattel mortgage and instituted this action to recover the remaining
deficiency. The district court granted summary judgment in respondent's
favor4 because at the time the loan was made, Texas law provided that a
married woman could not bind her separate property unless she had first
obtained a court decree removing her disability to contract. 1 The court of
appeals affirmed by a vote of two-to-one. 6 The Supreme Court HELD: The
federal interest in collecting the SBA loan does not warrant overriding the
Texas law of coverture.7
The problem of delineating the proper spheres for the application of
federal and state laws has been with us ever since the decision of Erie R.R.
v. Tornpkins.8 Although the Erie doctrine originally required federal courts
to apply state law only when exercising their "diversity jurisdiction," 9 the
courts soon began to apply state law to situations much broader than di-
versity proceedings, e.g., where the Government rather than a private
citizen was one of the parties to the litigation."' One recently have guide-
lines for determining the applicability of state or federal law in government
agency proceedings begun to appear. Thus, federal law has been applied
where the activities of the Government or the government agency were au-
thorized by the Constitution 11 or a relevant federal statute," or where there
was a sufficient federal interest to override the state law." The underlying
reason for the application of federal law in all these instances is the require-
1 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
2 See Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384 (1958), 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1964).
3 Supra note 1, at 345.
4 A judgment was entered against the husband from which no appeal was taken.
5 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4626 (1960). This section is now amended so as
to give married women the capacity to contract. Texas Acts 1963, ch. 472, § 6.
6 334 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1964).
7 Supra note 1. Harlan, J., concurring insofar as the federal interest is not over-
riding; Black, Douglas and White, JJ. dissenting.
8 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2: "The Judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies .. .
between Citizens of different States."
to Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 798 (1957).
11 See, e.g., United Stares v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 182 (1944);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) ; United States v. McCabe,
261 F.2d 539, 543 (8th Cir. 1958).
12 See, e.g., United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 333 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 714-15 (3d Cir. 1963) ; American Houses, Inc. v.
Schneider, 211 F.2d 881, 883 (3d Cir. 1954).
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ment of a uniform national disposition in matters which vitally affect the
interests and powers of the United States or its agencies."
The application of "federal common law" in the area of governmental
activities began with the Supreme Court's decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States," involving a government claim against the endorser of a
forged check. In affirming a court of appeals decision," the Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . does not apply to
this action. The rights and duties of the United States on com-
mercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than
local law. When the United States disburses its funds or pays its
debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power. . . . The
authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and
the statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent on
the laws of . . . any . . . state."
Although Clearfield dealt with commercial paper issued by the government,
the language used by the Court suggested that the general rule of Erie was
inapplicable whenever the litigation concerned the exercise of a constitutional
grant of power or any federal action that was designed to carry out that
grant of power.
Since disaster loans are authorized by an amendment to the Small
Business Act of 1953" and apparently rest on the constitutional authority of
the commerce clause," it would seem that the present case should be governed
by federal law. The SBA is an agency of the sovereign government, and
since it operates on the basis of a federal statute, the validity of its acts
should not be decided by another sovereignty 20 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, distinguished its Clearfield decision on the basis that Clearfield involved
the remedial rights of the United States with regard to commercial paper
issued by the United States and that local law is deemed inconsistent with
the appropriate federal rule only when it frustrates the remedies of the gov-
ernment. 21 Local law, on the other hand, is not opposed to the federal interest
when it merely stipulates procedures that have to be followed in effectuating
a valid transaction. This was demonstrated in Bumb v. United States, 22
where the local recording statute was applied because it did not purport to
14 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
15 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Dumbauld, The Clear Field of Clearfield, 61 Dick. L. Rev.
299 (1957).
14
 United States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1942).
17 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 11.
14 69 Stat. 549 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1964).
19 See Small Business Act of 1953, § 202, 67 Stat. /32 (1953), 15 U.S.C. § 631
(1964).
20 This is the argument of the dissent, both in the court of appeals, 334 F.2d at
456, and in the Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 359-60, quoting 334 F.2d at 456 (Pretty-
man, J. dissenting).
21 Supra note 1, at 354. See also United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc.,
supra note 12.
22 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960).
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preclude the government's remedy in foreclosing a validity created security
interest. The local requirement of filing notice did not inhibit the govern-
ment's right to require security for its loans.
In the instant case the Texas statute did not frustrate any remedy of
the United States. It merely provided that in order for a married woman to
enter into a valid contract, she must first obtain a court decree removing
her disability under coverture. Such a court decree could have been easily
obtained, and the Supreme Court pointed out that the SBA must be charged
with the knowledge that the contract would be subject to the Texas law of
coverture since (I) the loan was individually negotiated by officials of the
SBA located in Texas and (2) the transaction was approved by Texas
counsel.23
 The Supreme Court, therefore, did not find that the instant case
fell within the Clearfield rule, and it must be concluded that the authorization
of the governmental activity by a constitutional grant of power and a federal
statute is not sufficient to bring a case within the exclusive control of the
federal common law. Another criterion is needed in these cases in which
procedural rights only are regulated by local law.
Two recent decisions used the "overriding federal interest" as a cri-
terion and reached opposite results. In Bumb v. United States,' the court
held that the SBA as a creditor was subject to the California Bulk Sales
Statute in regard to third party creditors and indicated that the Government
should not be afforded any preferential treatment merely because it, rather
than a private lending agency, had loaned the defendant money. The court
phrased the test for the applicability of federal or state law in terms of
commercial inconvenience and impairment of federal policy resulting from
the adoption of state law as the federal rule. It found that local requirements
governing the creation of a valid security interest did not interfere with
federal policy and did not create any undue hardship on the SBA since the
bulk sales statutes embody the well-established policy that prior creditors
should be given some modicum of protection.
In United States v. Helz25
 on the other hand, a wife's defense of cover-
ture under Michigan law failed in an action brought by the United States
under the National Housing Act26
 for the balance due on FHA notes exe-
cuted by both husband and wife. The test used here was simply stated in
terms of "affecting government money and the credit of the government,"27
and the defense of coverture was rejected because the note was executed
under the National Housing Act which facilitates the building of homes by
the use of federal credit. The only distinguishing characteristic between the
Helz case and the instant case seems to be that different federal agencies
are involved, and indeed, the dissenters in both the court of appeals and in
the Supreme Court wanted to apply the Helz case.28
 Its test, however, was
rejected as insufficient by the majority:
23 Supra note 1, at 345-46.
24 Supra note 22.
25 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963).
28
 48 Stat. 1246 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1703 (1964).
27
 United States v. Helz, supra note 25, at 303.
28 334 F.2d at 456; supra note 1, at 360.
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Undeniably there is always a federal interest to collect moneys
which the Government lends. . . • But this serves merely to present
the question—not to answer it. Every creditor has the same interest
in this respect; every creditor wants to collect. The United States,
as sovereign, has certain preferences and priorities, but neither Con-
gress nor this Court has ever asserted that they are absolute."
Instead the Supreme Court promulgated the test of whether there is a "federal
interest" which is so clear and substantial that it cannot be served con-
sistently without suffering major damage if state law is applied." In the
instant case the Court did not find the federal interest to be so clear
and substantial: There is no congressional enactment or agency regulation
with regard to the particular institution of coverture; the contract was indi-
vidually negotiated, and the SBA was aware and chargeable with the knowl-
edge that the contract would be subject to the Texas law of coverture; there
is no need for uniformity as the SBA can easily comply with state law re-
quirements. On the other hand, the law of coverture is part of a complex of
family and family-property arrangements which were carefully evolved and
designed to serve multiple purposes, and the Court did not want to establish
a new principle which might cast doubt upon the effectiveness of the laws of
ten other states" relating to the contractual positions of married women."
The area of family and family-property arrangements is peculiarly within
the local jurisdiction of the states, and the Supreme Court cited Fink v.
O'Neil" for the principle that state law has invariably been observed in
such cases. Where a federal agency is involved in a number of different
functions, it seems possible that state law would be more applicable on
some questions and federal laws more appropriate in others. In the instant
case the Supreme Court does not lay down any guides, since it does not
say under what circumstances a federal interest is so clear and substantial
that it will override state law. It does not even mention the Bunab test of
commercial inconvenience and impairment of federal policy, although that
test is more concrete than the test of "clear and substantial federal interest"
and would have led to the same result.
It is submitted that the only guide available to lawyers trying these
cases is the "localness" of a particular agency function. In areas where real
property, recording acts, homestead laws, coverture provisions and other local
arrangements that are unique to the community are involved, the courts
should not interfere with the local law as long as it does not frustrate the
federal activity. The Supreme Court hints at this when it phrases the issue
in terms of "the intensely local interests of family property and the protec-
29 Id. at 348-49.
30 Id. at 352.
31 Id. at 351, 353.
32 Id. at 352-53.
33 106 U.S. 272 (1882). There the United States sought to levy execution against
property defined as homestead and exempted by the state from execution. The Supreme
Court held that Rev. Stat. 916 (1875), now Fed. R. Civ. P. 69, governed, and that
the remedies of the United States on judgments were limited to those provided by state
law.
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tion of married women."34 It may, therefore, be more profitable to state the
dividing line between federal and state law not so much in terms of a
vague "overriding federal interest" but rather in terms of the localized
penetration and relevance of the federal activity. If, after the local character
of the governmental function has been established, it is then decided that the
application of the state law will cause substantial commercial inconvenience
to the government agency and will impair an important federal policy, the
federal interest may be called overriding.
RAINER M. KOHLER
Labor Law—Railway Labor Act, Section 2 First—Employer's Duty to
Bargain Decision to Lease.—United Industrial Workers v. Board of
Trustees of Galveston Wharves.i—Galveston Wharves owned and operated
the dock facilities of the Port of Galveston, Texas, including a public grain
elevator. The employees at the grain elevator were covered by a collective
bargaining contract which their union and Galveston Wharves had executed
on October 1, 1960. It provided, in part, that employees be given seven days
notice before being laid off and also contained a broad management-preroga-
tives clause. The contract was dated to expire on September 30, 1963, but
the parties subsequently extended its effective date to September 30, 1964.
Some time before the expiration of the contract, Galveston Wharves leased
the grain elevator to a third party. On July 20, 1964, pursuant to contract
terms, the union served notice that it wished to open the agreement for
negotiation. On July 23, Galveston Wharves notified the union of the lease,
responded that it would not negotiate—presumably because of the lease—and
posted notice that, effective July 31, all elevator employees would be per-
manently laid off. On July 29, in accordance with Section 6 of the Railway
Labor Act,' the union served notice requesting negotiation on this matter.
Galveston Wharves replied that, under the circumstances, such negotiations
were impossible. On July 31, the union struck and also instituted an action
against Galveston Wharves under the RLA for an injunction prohibiting
consummation of the lease and restoring the status quo until RLA machinery 3
had been exhausted. Galveston Wharves claimed that its actions were justified
under the lay-off and management-prerogatives clauses. The trial court ac-
cepted this argument and found for the carrier. Reversing 2-1, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit HELD: Galveston Wharves had to bargain
with the union over its decision to lease the elevator. 4
34 Id. at 349.
1 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965).
2 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
3 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 156, 157 (1964).
4 Supra note 1, at 184. The interchangeability of Railway Labor Act major-minor
questions with mandatory bargaining questions under the Labor Management Relations
Act has been recognized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960), cited in Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964).
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